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Abstract—Covid-19 is primarily spread through contact with the virus which may survive on surfaces with lifespan of more than hours.
To curb its spread, it is hence of vital importance to detect and quarantine those who have been in contact with the virus for sustained
period of time, the so-called close contacts. The existing digital approaches for contact tracing focus only on direct face-to-face
contacts. There has not been any work detecting indirect environmental contact, which is to detect people coming into an area with
living virus, i.e., an area previously visited by an infected person within the virus lifespan.
In this work, we study, for the first time, automatic contact detection when the virus has a lifespan. Leveraging upon the ubiquity of WiFi
signals, we propose a novel, private, and fully distributed WiFi-based approach called vContact. Users installing an app continuously
scan WiFi and store its hashed IDs. Given a confirmed case, the signals of the major places he/she visited are then uploaded to a
server and matched with the stored signals of users to detect contact. vContact is not based on phone pairing, and no information of
any other users is stored locally. The confirmed case does not need to have installed the app for it to work properly. As WiFi data are
sampled sporadically, we propose efficient signal processing approaches and similarity metric to align and match signals of any time.
We conduct extensive indoor and outdoor experiments to evaluate the performance of vContact. Our results demonstrate that vContact
is efficient and robust for contact detection. The precision and recall of contact detection are high (in the range of 50–90%) for close
contact proximity (2m). Its performance is robust with respect to signal lengths (AP numbers) and phone heterogeneity. By
implementing vContact as an app, we present a case study to demonstrate the validity of our design in notifying its users their
exposure to virus with lifespan.
Index Terms—contact tracing, exposure notification, proximity detection, contact detection, COVID-19, epidemic control.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The outbreak of COVID-19 has had a profound impact on
our lives and the global economy. COVID-19, like many
other infectious diseases, is primarily spread through viral
contact. Recent studies have shown that the virus has a lifes-
pan: as airborne droplets it can last more than 10 minutes,
and on surfaces it can survive from hours to days if not
properly disinfected (in low temperatures it may last even
longer) [1] [2]. The health of any person coming into contact
with the virus for a sustained period of time, say 15–30
minutes, may be at risk [3]. In order to effectively contain
the disease, tracing and quarantining these close contacts as
soon as possible is of paramount importance.
Traditionally, close contacts are traced manually through
personal interviews with infected people by medical offi-
cers. Such manual approach is labour-intensive and slow.
Due to mis-memory, the contact information may be incom-
plete or error prone. Furthermore, the patient would not
possibly know the people in his/her proximity, and who
came into an area within the virus lifespan after he/she left.
To address the above problems, we propose a novel,
private, and digital contact tracing approach with virus
lifespan. Anyone in contact with living virus is considered
• The authors are with the Department of Computer Science and Engi-
neering, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Kowloon,
Hong Kong, China.
E-mail: gliaw@cse.ust.hk, siyanhu@ust.hk,shuhan.zhong@connect.ust.hk,
and gchan@cse.ust.hk.
• This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication.
Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may
no longer be accessible.
at risk. This includes those simultaneously locating with
the patient, and those visiting an area within the virus
lifespan after a patient. Leveraging upon ubiquitous WiFi
signals everywhere, we propose an automatic and fully
distributed WiFi-based approach called vContact to detect
the close contacts. As far as we know, this is the first
piece of work considering virus lifespan in private contact
tracing. Note that though for concreteness our discussion
will focus on WiFi signal, vContact can be straightforwardly
extended and applied to other radio-frequency signals (such
as Bluetooth) and their combination.
We illustrate the process of vContact in Figure 1. A user
first installs an application (app) and turns on the WiFi
sensor of the phone. The app periodically scans for WiFi,
with each scan a signal vector consisting of the following
two elements: 1) the signal IDs, which are the hashed
(and optionally encrypted) values of the MAC addresses
of the WiFi access points (APs); and 2) the corresponding
received signal strength indicators (RSSIs) of the signal IDs.
A signal vector is associated with a timestamp, which is the
scanning/collection time of the signals. Each signal vector
may be kept for a certain duration corresponding to the
virus incubation period, say 14 to 28 days. Over time, the
phone collects and stores a time series of the signal vectors,
termed signal profile, as the user roams in the city.
Upon positive confirmation in hospital, the patient has
the following two possibilities:
• With the app installed: With the consent of the patient,
the health officer may access his/her signal profile
(the patient may blank out or filter some parts of the
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2Fig. 1. The process of vContact contact tracing using WiFi.
signal profile for personal reasons before sharing it
with the officer). Note that due to AP MAC hash-
ing (and possibly encryption), the officer does not
know the patient geo-locations, but only clusters of
anonymized IDs with different dwell time. Based on
that, the officer works with the patient to identify
the venues of potential health risks to the public.
These anonymized IDs of risk are extracted and
labelled with assessed virus lifespan, and the pro-
cessed signal profile is uploaded to a secure server
for other users to match in a distributed manner.
Upon matching, users are alerted in private if they
have close contact with the virus.
• Without the app: In this case, the confirmed case has
to rely on his/her memory of the major venues and
their visit time as the manual case. Then some staff
will go to the places (the infected areas) to collect
offline their WiFi information and label them with
the visit time of the patient. These signals, after hash-
ing and processing, are then uploaded and matched
by the users the same way as in the case above.
(Clearly, we consider the realistic condition that all
WiFi signals at a position do not change drastically
over some short period of time, say, days, so that the
signals collected some days after the patient’s visit
still reflects well the signals of the visit then.)
Works have been done on automatic digital contact
tracing. Some use GPS [4] and cellular signals [5]. While
effective, these approaches cannot be extended to indoor
environment. They are also based on explicit user geo-
locations, which raises concerns on location privacy. Some
privacy-preserving approaches based on Bluetooth have
attracted much attention and been implemented recently [6]
[3] [7]. However, they work for only direct face-to-face
contact tracing, and cannot be applied to the case with non-
zero virus lifespan (environmental exposure). They are also
based on phone pairing and communication, which leads to
concerns on security and require a high adoption rate for
effective tracing. vContact is orthogonal to them, and may
be integrated with some of them (such as [3] [7]). Compared
with existing works, vContact has the following strengths:
• Contact detection with virus lifespan: vContact is the
first piece of work to capture the realistic scenario of
virus lifespan. It comprehensively covers, in a single
framework, those in direct face-to-face contact with
an infected person and indirect environmental expo-
sure with the areas previously visited by an infected
person. The lifespan of the virus, set at the time of
signal upload, may be heterogeneous depending on
the frequency of disinfection operation in the venue.
• No phone-to-phone pairing and communication: Prior
contact tracing proposals based on Bluetooth require
phone pairing, which means both phones, including
the infected one, have to install the app simultane-
ously for it to work properly. To achieve tracing effec-
tiveness, they hence demand a high adoption rate (in
the range of reportedly 40% – 70%). In contrast, each
vContact phone operates independently without any
pairing or communication, and does not require the
confirmed case to have installed the app. This greatly
reduces the adoption barrier. Furthermore, app users
do not store any information of or exchange any
message with the other users; it hence offers much
better protection on user anonymity and attacks.
• Data privacy: vContact uses no personal information
such as names, phone numbers, IDs, contact lists,
images/videos, etc. Because phones are indepen-
dent without any mutual exchange of information,
no data are generated and communicated between
phones, and no information of other users is kept in
a phone. The collected WiFi data with hashed IDs are
exclusively stored in one’s own phone. The phone
data never leave local storage without the explicit
consent of the user, and even so (i.e., the case of
a confirmed case) the data remain anonymous at
the server. Upon detection of close contact, vContact
conveys such message to its user in private without
any data upload.
• Decentralization: vContact is fully decentralized
where contact is computed locally on user phones
in a scalable manner without any entity (users or
server) having full information. Such data fragmen-
tation and minimization prevent data re-purposing,
abuse, and mis-use. As no user data is stored any-
where else beyond one’s phone, a user may exit the
system at any time by un-installation without leaving
his/her data behind. The system can also be quickly
dismantled through such app un-installation once
the pandemic is over.
• No GPS-based geo-location: vContact is not based on
GPS signal. Because it uses only the hashed values of
WiFi MAC addresses (signal IDs), the user’s physi-
cal geo-location is non-transparent and unnecessary.
This offers much stronger location confidentiality
than other GPS-based geo-location approaches, be-
cause the association of all signal IDs to their physical
locations takes enormously large amount of manual
work (that is to visit every indoor and outdoor corner
of the city and logging down the locations of all the
MAC addresses encountered). Furthermore, unlike
other GPS approaches, vContact can detect indoor
contacts, and hence is more pervasive by covering
both indoor and outdoor areas.
Detecting close contact using WiFi data is a challenging
3Fig. 2. Overview of contact detection using WiFi in vContact.
problem because of the following issues. First, signal vectors
are sampled sporadically at random discrete time, resulting
in difficulties to detect contact at any arbitrary time. More-
over, signals may be sparsely sampled in the space. The
scanned IDs of different users may also differ due to phone
heterogeneity on antenna design and sensitivity. vContact
overcomes these problems by employing a novel approach
to represent the values between consecutive signal vectors
and an efficient similarity metric to match signal values for
contact detection.
We present in Figure 2 an overview of contact detection
using WiFi in vContact. If the signal profile of the con-
firmed case is available, we represent the RSSIs between
consecutive signal vectors of the patient as a processed vector
to support vector comparison. The resultant sequence of
these processed vectors is called processed profile. For the
case where the confirmed case has not installed the app,
the WiFi data collected by staff in the infected areas are
transformed to a processed profile. Given the signal vector
of a user at t, if t falls in the time range of the virus lifespan
of a processed vector, we compare their level of matching
using our proposed signal similarity metric. If the similarity
is larger than a given threshold α, the user is identified as
having contact with the virus at t. A user is identified as a
close contact if the contact time exceeds a certain sustained
period of time as specified by health officials.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses related works. Section 3 presents the
approach of vContact. We have implemented vContact as
a software development kit (SDK), and discuss the experi-
ment setting and illustrative results on the SDK in Section 4.
With the SDK, we have developed an app and present its
implementation details and measurement in Section 5. We
conclude in Section 6.
2 RELATED WORKS
Contact tracing has attracted much attention due to the
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this section, we
present some well-known systems and schemes proposed
in the industry and academia.
Google and Apple provide a toolkit for privacy-
preserving contact tracing using Bluetooth [8]. Various con-
tact tracing systems have been deployed in some coun-
tries, such as TraceTogether in Singapore [9], COVIDSafe
in Australia [10], Corowarner in Turkey [11], Aarogya Setu
in India [12], Cotrack in Argentina [13], Covid Watch in
US [14], etc. TraceTogether, COVIDSafe and Covid Watch
use Bluetooth, Corowarner and Aarogya Setu use GPS and
Bluetooth, and Cotrack uses RFID, GPRS, GPS, and telecom-
munication technologies. TraceTogether [9] is the app re-
leased by the government of Singapore. Users broadcast
their ID using Bluetooth and scan their nearby user’s ID.
When a user is infected, the government can trace people
who have close contact with the infected one based on
the data. Other apps are based on the similar concept as
TraceTogether. As compared with them, vContact is not
based on phone pairing, and hence it breaks the requirement
of simultaneous app installation. It also offers better user
privacy because users are informed in private on contacts.
Contact tracing becomes a hot research topic in academia
recently. Many research works focus on contact tracing
using different signals [15]. Some of them use signals which
reveal user geo-location, such as GPS [16] [17] [18] [19],
cellular data [20] [21], and radio frequency identification
(RFID) [22] [23]. GPS signal provides a user’s exact location,
but it is usually weak and noisy in indoor environment,
which limits its contact coverage. Cellular data can also
be used for contact tracing to infer a user’s public trans-
portation trips [20] [21]. Given the user cellular data, we
can detect users who are taking the same bus, train, or
subway as a confirmed case. However, the radius of the cell
towers signal is large, and hence close proximity is difficult
to be detected. Some researchers also propose using RFID to
understand contact [22] [23]. However, extra devices have to
be deployed. GPS data, cellular data, and RFID data can be
extended to contact tracing with virus lifespan, but they may
raise privacy concerns as they provide user geo-location.
Compared with them, vContact uses only the hashed values
of WiFi MAC addresses (signal IDs), users physical geo-
location is non-transparent and unnecessary, offering much
stronger location confidentiality.
To protect user location privacy, some works propose
using magnetometer [24] and Bluetooth data [3] [7] [6]
[25] [26] [27] [28] for contact tracing, in which user geo-
location is not required. However, geomagnetism suffers
from environment change. Even a small change in the
environment may result in different geomagnetism signals
for a location, which limits its extension to contact tracing
with virus lifespan. The works focusing on Bluetooth data
can be categorized into two groups. Some works rely on
a third-party server for contact tracing [6] [26] [28], which
raises the concern of possible data abuse. To address it,
others advocate fully distributed approaches. Chan et al. [7]
propose privacy-sensitive protocols and mechanisms called
PACT. Troncoso et al. [3] propose a decentralized system
called DP-3T for privacy-preserving contact tracing using
Bluetooth data. User ID is encrypted and changed over
time, and the user data are stored locally. Similar to DP-
3T, some researchers propose PACT [29], which is a sim-
ple decentralized approach using smartphones for contact
tracing based on Bluetooth proximity. Avitabile et al. [30]
show that the privacy issues in DP-3T are not intrinsic
in any BLE-based contact tracing system, and propose a
different system named Pronto-C2. Brack et al. [31] use a
distributed hash table to build a decentralized messaging
4system for contact tracing. All these schemes are indepen-
dently designed and very similar, apart from some minor
variations on implementation and efficiency. Most of the
above works focus on detecting face-to-face close contact,
and they cannot be extended to the case with virus lifespan.
Compared with them, we propose a private WiFi-based
approach to detect close contacts with virus lifespan. To the
best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first piece of work
considering virus lifespan in private contact tracing using
WiFi. Moreover, no phone pairing and communication are
needed in our proposed scheme.
3 CONTACT DETECTION IN VCONTACT
As mentioned, we use the signal profile for contact tracing,
which is a sequence of signal vectors over time. The formal
definitions of signal vector and signal profile are as follows.
Definition 1. (Signal vector) The signal vector A is
represented as {(a1, s1), (a2, s2), ..., (ai, si), ..., (an, sn)},
where ai is the signal ID (hashed and possibly encrypted
AP MAC address) and si is its RSSI.
Definition 2. (Signal profile) A user’s signal profile is de-
fined as a sequence of signal vectors over time: W =
{(A1, t1), (A2, t2), ..., (Ai, ti), ..., (An, tn)}, where Ai is
the signal vector that is scanned at time ti.
In other words, a signal vector represents the signals
and RSSIs scanned by a user device at a timestamp, while
a signal profile represents the signal vectors which are col-
lected over time. As shown in Figure 2, given a user’s signal
profile W = {(A1, t1), (A2, t2), ..., (Ai, ti), ..., (An, tn)}, we
would like to detect if the user has contact with the virus
at each ti by comparing the similarity of a signal vector at
t and the signal profile of a confirmed case or an infected
area.
In this section, we present data processing approaches
to construct processed profiles from raw signal profiles for
confirmed cases who have installed the app (Section 3.1) and
for the confirmed cases who have not, i.e., the infected areas
case (in Section 3.2). We then propose an efficient signal
similarity metric to measure the signal similarity, given a
user’s signal vector and a processed vector (Section 3.3).
Finally, we summarize by presenting the contact detection
algorithm (Section 3.4).
3.1 Signal profile processing for a patient with app
Signals are not sampled continuously but at sporadic and
random intervals. We propose a data processing approach
to construct continuous processed profiles from raw signal
profiles for patients with installed app.
We present a toy example of signal profile pro-
cessing in Figure 3. A confirmed case’s signal profile
{(A1, t1), (A2, t2), (A3, t3), (A4, t4)} consists of some signal
vectors at discrete times. We aim to construct a continuous
processed profile from the raw signal profile so that the sig-
nal vector at an arbitrary time can be compared. To achieve
the goal, we construct processed vectors Aˆi from any two
consecutive signal vectors Ai and Ai+1, and consider the
virus lifespan τi. The virus lifespan τi can be various for
different time slots.
Fig. 3. Signal profile processing for a confirmed case with app.
We define a processed vector as follows.
Definition 3. (Processed vector) A processed vector is de-
fined as: Aˆ = {(a1, smin1 , smax1 ), (a2, smin2 , smax2 ), ..., (ai,
smini , s
max
i ), ..., (an, s
min
n , s
max
n )}, where
(ai, s
min
i , s
max
i ) denotes that the RSSI range of a
signal ai is from smini to s
max
i .
The signal strength in a processed vector is repre-
sented as a range instead of an exact value in a signal
vector. Given two consecutive signal vectors in a signal
profile Ai = {(ai1, si1), ..., (aij , sij), ...(ain, sin)} at ti and
Ai+1 = {(ai+11 , si+11 ), ..., (ai+1k , si+1k ), ...(ai+1m , si+1m )} at ti+1,
the processed vector in the time range from ti to ti+1 is
denoted as Aˆ = {(a`, smin` , smax` )|` = 1, 2, ..., |Ai ∪ Ai+1|},
where a` ∈ Ai.a ∪Ai+1.a and (smin` , smax` ) is denoted as
(min(sij , s
i+1
k ),max(s
i
j , s
i+1
k )), a` ∈ Ai.a ∩Ai+1.a,
(γ, sij), a` ∈ Ai.a, a` /∈ Ai+1.a,
(γ, si+1k ), a` ∈ Ai+1.a, a` /∈ Ai.a.
(1)
Here, γ is a value indicating a weak signal strength, which
is set to be −100 in our experiments. Then, we construct a
continuous processed profile from a confirmed case’s signal
profile considering the virus lifespan. We present a formal
definition of a processed profile.
Definition 4. (Processed profile) A processed profile
contains a sequence of processed vectors over time: Wˆ =
{(Aˆ1, tstart1 , tend1 ), (Aˆ2, tstart2 , tend2 ), ..., (Aˆi, tstarti , tendi ), ...
(Aˆm, t
start
m , t
end
m )}, where Aˆi is a processed vector for the
time slot from tstarti to t
end
i , and (t
start
i , t
end
i ) indicates
the time slot of the virus lifespan.
Given a confirmed case’s signal profile W =
{(A1, t1), (A2, t2), ..., (Ai, ti), ...(An, tn)}, the processed
profile is represented as Wˆ = {(Aˆ1, t1, t2 + τ1), (Aˆ2, t2, t3 +
τ2), ..., (Aˆi, ti, ti+1+ τi), ..., (Aˆn−1, tn−1, tn+ τn−1)}, where
Aˆi is constructed from Ai and Ai+1 and τi is the virus
lifespan for the time slot from ti to ti+1. Noting that
τi is given by the health officer, and it can be various
for different time slots depending on the frequency of
disinfection operation in the venues.
3.2 Signal profile processing for infected areas
We consider the case where the patient has not installed
the app. In this case, we need to extract the signals in the
infected areas through a survey (signal collection process).
We can evaluate if a user has contact with an infected area by
measuring the similarity of her/his signal vector and signal
vectors of each position in the area. However, collecting
WiFi data for every position in the infected area is inefficient.
We propose to construct the processed profile for an infected
area using some sampled signal data in the area.
5Fig. 4. Signal profile processing for an infected area.
TABLE 1
Average number of signals in a signal vector for various mobile phones
Phone Average number of signals
Honor 75.00
Huawei Mate 30 128.12
OPPO 180.16
Huawei Nova 92.87
Xiaomi 102.09
Instead of collecting signal data at every position, staff
walk around the area with a WiFi-on device such as a
phone or a Raspberry Pi. The collected signal profile is
some signal vectors over time. To generate a representa-
tive processed profile for the area, we would union all
signals and their RSSIs in the signal profile. As shown in
Figure 4, we merge the signal vectors in the signal profile
{(A1, t1), (A2, t2), (A3, t3), (A4, t4)} which are collected in
the infected area. We also consider the time range [t, t′] when
a confirmed case staying in the area and the virus lifespan τ
to construct the processed profile for the infected area.
The processed profile of an area is represented as
Wˆ = (Aˆ, tstart, tend), where Aˆ is a processed vector and
[tstart, tend] is the time range of the virus lifespan. Given
the signal profile collected in the infected area W =
{(A1, t1), (A2, t2), ..., (Ai, ti), ...(An, tn)}, the time range of
a confirmed case staying in the area [t, t′], and the virus
lifespan τ , the processed profile Wˆ = (Aˆ, tstart, tend) is con-
structed as follows: Aˆ = {(aj , sminj , smaxj )|j = 1, 2, ..., | ∪ni
Ai.a|} where aj is a scanned signal in W (i.e., aj ∈ ∪ni Ai.a),
and sminj is the minimum signal strength of aj in W while
smaxj is the maximum signal strength of aj in W ; the
surviving time of the virus in the infected area is from tstart
to tend.
3.3 Signal Similarity Metric
We propose a signal similarity metric to compare the simi-
larity of a signal vector and a processed vector for contact
detection. The metric considers the signal IDs overlap ratio
and the RSSI difference.
It is intuitive that the closer a user to the location of the
virus, the more common signals in the user’s signal vectors
and the processed vectors in the processed profile. Thus,
we could use the overlap ratio of two vectors’ signal IDs to
indicate their proximity. Given a user signal vector A at time
t and a processed vector Aˆ, the overlap ratio is calculated
as:
O =
|A.a ∩ Aˆ.a|
min(|A.a|, |Aˆ.a|) , (2)
where A.a is the Signal IDs in A, Aˆ.a is the signal IDs in Aˆ,
and | · | denotes the number of signal IDs.
The reason of using min(|A.a|, |Aˆ.a|) is to alleviate the
impact of device heterogeneity. Different devices have dif-
ferent abilities to scan signals. Two co-located devices may
scan different numbers of signals. Table 1 shows the average
numbers of signals in a signal vector of various co-located
phones in a shopping mall. The average number of signals is
heterogeneous for different phones. The difference could be
significant for some phones. In this case, using |A.a|, |Aˆ.a|
or other terms (e.g. |A.a ∪ Aˆ.a|) as the denominator will
introduce more variance.
A signal could cover a large area, it is possible that
two vectors with a large proportion of common signals
are not in close proximity. Thus, we also consider the RSSI
difference to denote the proximity. If a user stays close with
the virus, the RSSI difference of the same signal in two
vectors should be small. Given a user signal vector A =
{(a1, t1), (a2, t2), ...(ai, ti), ...(an, tn)} and a processed vec-
tor Aˆ = {(a1, smin1 , smax2 ), (a2, smin2 , smax2 ), ..., (aj , sminj ,
smaxj ), ..., (am, s
min
m , s
max
m )}, for ak ∈ A.a ∩ Aˆ.a, its RSSI
difference is calculated as
d(ak) =

sminj − si, si < sminj ,
si − smaxj , si > smaxj ,
0, otherwise.
(3)
The average RSSI difference at a timestamp is defined as
D =
∑
ak∈(A.a∩Aˆ.a) d(ak)
|A.a ∩ Aˆ.a| , (4)
where | · | denotes the number of signal IDs.
When a user has contact with the virus, the overlap score
O (Equation 2) should be large, while the RSSI difference
D (Equation 4) should be small. Therefore, we define the
signal similarity of A and Aˆ as
P (A, Aˆ) =
O
D + 1
, (5)
where 0 ≤ P (A, Aˆ) ≤ 1. A larger P (A, Aˆ) indicates closer
proximity.
3.4 Contact detection algorithm
Anyone having contact with the surviving virus may be at
risk. Given a user’s signal vector Ai at ti, if the timestamp ti
is within the virus lifespan, and the similarity of Ai and the
processed profile of a confirmed case or an infected area is
larger than a threshold, the user will be detected as having
contact with the virus at ti. The algorithm is presented in
Algorithm 1.
Given a user’s signal profile W1, the signal profile of
a confirmed case or an infected area W2, the virus lifes-
pan {τi|i = 1, 2, ..., |W2| − 1} and a proximity threshold
α, we first construct the processed profile from W2 and
{τi|i = 1, 2, ..., |W2| − 1} (Line 4). Then for each signal
vector Ai at time ti in W1, if ti falls in the time slot of a
processed vector in the processed profile, we calculate the
signal similarity (using Equation 5) at ti (Line 7 ∼ 9). If
the similarity at ti is larger than the given threshold α, the
user is identified as having contact with the virus at ti (Line
11). The algorithm evaluates the similarity of each signal
vector in W1 and Wˆ , and returns a list of detection results.
The threshold α depends on how we define the contact
6Algorithm 1: Contact Detection
1 Input: A user’s signal profile W1 ;
A confirmed case’s or an infected area’s signal
profile W2;
Virus lifespan {τi|i = 1, 2, ..., |W2| − 1};
A proximity threshold α.
2 Output: results of contact detection at different
timestamps.
3 Initialize S to empty;
4 Construct the processed profile Wˆ from W2 and
{τi|i = 1, 2, ..., |W2| − 1};
5 foreach (Ai, ti) ∈W1 do
6 contact = False;
7 foreach (Aˆj , tstartj , t
end
j ) ∈ Wˆ do
8 if tstartj ≤ ti ≤ tendj then
9 s = P (Ai, Aˆj);
10 if s ≥ α then
11 contact = True;
12 break;
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 if contact == True then
17 Add (True, ti) to S;
18 else
19 Add (False, ti) to S;
20 end
21 return S
proximity for close contact. We will discuss the relationship
between the signal similarity and physical proximity, and
the determination for the proximity threshold α in the
following section.
4 ILLUSTRATIVE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented and packaged vContact as a Soft-
ware Development Kit (SDK) (for app implementation as
discussed in Section 5). In this section, we present illustra-
tive experiment results on the SDK. We first introduce the
experiment settings in Section 4.1. Then we study how to set
the threshold α in Section 4.2. We discuss the performance in
different sites and for different AP numbers in Sections 4.3
and 4.4, respectively. The studies on heterogeneous devices
and in-out detection of an infected area are then presented
(Sections 4.5 and 4.6). We finally compare vContact with
other state-of-the-art approaches in Section 4.7.
4.1 Settings
To evaluate the performance of our contact detection ap-
proach, we collect WiFi data using five mobile phones in
three different sites. The brands of phones are different,
including Honor, Huawei Nova, Huawei Mate30, Xiaomi,
and OPPO. The three experimental sites are an office, a bus
station, and a store in a shopping mall. The size of the
office is around 10m×12m. The bus station is an outdoor
area, the size of which is around 2m×15m. The area in the
shopping mall for experiments is a large store with a size of
20m×25m. The total signal numbers are 32 in the office, 109
in the bus station, and 301 in the shopping mall. The average
number of signals (i.e. scanned APs) in signal vectors of the
office, bus station, and shopping mall are 19.02, 24.0, 46.29,
respectively.
To evaluate the detection performance for the case where
the signal profiles of confirmed cases are available, we first
put the five mobile devices at a location `0 for 10 minutes
to collect the WiFi data in each site. The WiFi signals with
RSSIs scanned by a device are collected. Then we put the
devices at a location `i for 10 minutes for data collection,
where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and the distance between
`0 and `i is i meters. The data sampling rate is set as 5s per
record, so we have around 120 records of data for a device
in each distance setting for each site.
To evaluate the detection performance for the case where
a confirmed case’s signal profile is unavailable, we walk in
the experimental sites to collect WiFi data using a mobile
phone to construct the processed profiles for each site. Then
we wander around and outside the area with five mobile
phones collecting WiFi data for testing. The time when
we were in and outside the area is recorded during the
experiments.
Given the data D collected by a user’s device, we use
Da to denote the data which are collected when the user
has contact with the virus (i.e. within the contact proximity
with a confirmed case or in an infected area), and use Db
to denote the data which are detected as having contact
with the virus. The Da is the ground-truth data while the
Db is the detection result. Precision, recall, and F1-score are
used as metrics to evaluate the contact detection results. The
precision is defined as
precision =
|Da ∩Db|
|Db| , (6)
where | · | represents the data size. Similarly, recall is defined
as
recall =
|Da ∩Db|
|Da| . (7)
Based on the definition of precision and recall, F1-score is
defined as
F1 = 2 ∗ precision ∗ recall
precision+ recall
. (8)
4.2 Threshold α
As introduced in Section 3, the contact detection algorithm
relies on a threshold α to identify contacts. In this section,
we discuss the selection of α. Given the contact proximity
km, if the distance of a user and the virus is less than km,
she/he should be detected as having contact with the virus.
Intuitively, α is relevant to the contact proximity and it
should be different for different contact proximity. We use
the data collected at `0 in a site as the data from confirmed
cases, and detect contacts for data which are collected at
`i (i > 0) in the same site. When k meters is set as the contact
proximity, Da contains the data collected at `i where i ≤ k.
Precision and recall are used as metrics, and the results
of α versus precision and recall for k = 1m, k = 2m and
k = 4m are presented in Figure 5. As the threshold α in-
creases, the precision increases while the recall declines. The
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Fig. 5. Precision and Recall for different contact proximity K.
reason is that a larger threshold indicates closer proximity.
Thus, increasing the threshold would lead to high precision.
However, if the threshold is set too large, some of the data
the distance of which is less than km will not be detected,
resulting in a drop in recall.
The threshold can be selected according to the require-
ments of precision and recall for close contact detection. To
balance the precision and recall, we select the intersection
points, the precision and recall of which are equal for our
following discussion. In Figure 5(a), the precision and recall
for k = 1m are low when α is set as 0.25, which indicates
identifying contact within 1m is difficult. As shown in
Figures 5(b), the precision and recall for k = 2m have
a significant improvement when the threshold is around
0.20. The precision and recall in Figure 5(c) for k = 4m
are high (around 70%) if the threshold is around 0.17. We
use the same strategy to select thresholds for other contact
proximity.
4.3 Site study
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Fig. 6. Precision and recall in different sites.
We present the performance of contact detection in dif-
ferent sites in this section. We use different distance (k =
1m, 2m, 3m, 4m, 5m) to denote the contact proximity, the
threshold is set according to the discussion in Section 4.2.
Results of precision versus contact proximity are shown in
Figure 6(a), while results of recall versus contact proximity
are shown in Figure 6(b).
In Figure 6(a), as the contact proximity increases, the pre-
cision in the three sites increases, indicating that it is easier
to detect contacts within larger proximity. The precision for
k = 1m is low in all sites. The result shows the difficulties
in identifying whether the contact happens in 1m because
the WiFi signals within a 1-m range are usually similar.
However, the precision has significant improvements for
larger contact proximity. The precision is high (50% – 70%)
when the proximity is 2m. The precision indoors (office and
shopping mall) is better than the precision outdoors because
WiFi signals is more stable indoors. The improvement is
more significant in the office scenario compared with the
shopping mall scenario. The recall shown in Figure 6(b) is
similar to the results of precision. Our approach has a good
performance on recall when k ≥ 2m.
4.4 AP number
In this part, we evaluate the impact of AP number on the
performance when the contact proximity is set as k = 2m. .
We randomly filtering σ% signals from the signal vectors for
each site, and compare the signal similarity of two devices
for contact detection. The filtering rate σ% is set to be 10%
– 90%. The precision and recall versus the average signal
number are presented in Figures 7.
In Figure 7, as the average signal number increases, the
precision increases slightly. The precision is still acceptable
when the average signal number is small. Even removing
90% signals, the precision does not drop significantly for the
office and shopping mall sites. The precision outdoors (the
bus station) is more stable than others. The recall shown in
Figure 7 does not have obvious change as the signal number
changes, demonstrating the robustness of our approach.
4.5 Heterogeneous devices
Different devices have different abilities to scan WiFi sig-
nals. Two co-located devices may scan different signals and
RSSIs. We evaluate the performance of different devices. For
each device, we compare its data at `0 with other devices’
data at `i (i > 0) in the same site. We set the contact
proximity as 1m – 5m and set the threshold following the
discussion in Section 4.2. Precision and recall are used as
metrics.
The precision versus contact proximity for different de-
vices in the office site is presented in Figure 8(a). Given
the contact proximity, the precision is different for distinct
devices, which is consistent with our discussion. As the
contact proximity increases, the precision of all devices
increases. The precision of all devices significantly increases
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Fig. 7. Impact of signal numbers (AP numbers) on the performance of contact detection.
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Fig. 8. Precision and recall of different devices.
when k ≥ 2m. The recall versus contact proximity for
different devices in the office is presented in Figure 8(b).
Similar to the result of precision, the performance of all
devices have a large improvement in recall when k = 2m.
All devices achieve high recall when k ≥ 2m, indicating the
good performance of our approach on recall. The results
demonstrate that our approach is efficient and it can be
applied to phones of different brands. We have similar
findings in the experiments on the other two sites. We do not
show the results of the other sites due to the page limitation.
4.6 In-out detection of infected areas
Contact detection for confirmed cases without the app is to
detect whether a user is in or outside an infected area. We
construct processed profiles for the office, bus station, and a
store in a shopping mall using the collected WiFi data. Then
we compare the similarity between the processed profile
of the area and the data collected in and outside the area.
If the similarity is larger than the threshold α, the data is
identified as being collected in the area and having contact
with the virus. α is set as 0.2 in the experiment. Precision
and recall are used as the metrics for evaluation. The results
are shown in Figure 9. The detection in all the sites achieves
good performances. The precision and recall are high for the
three sites, illustrating vContact is very efficient for in-out
detection of infected areas.
4.7 Comparison with other approaches
We have compared vContact with some other state-of-the-
art approaches, which are introduced as follows,
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Fig. 9. Precision and recall of in-out detection.
• Bluetooth: It is widely used for digital contact tracing,
such as schemes [29] [7] [3]. To collect Bluetooth
data, two mobile devices are put at a distance of k
meters for 10 minutes in the three experimental sites,
where k is set to be {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}.
We use one device as the broadcaster, and another
as scanner. The scanner can scan the Bluetooth signal
from the broadcaster, and the RSSI is recorded over
time. For each contact proximity k meters, a thresh-
old is selected for contact detection. If a received
signal strength is larger than the threshold, they are
detected as having contact.
• Jaccard similarity: It is used to evaluate the similarity
of two sets, and it is defined as the size of the
intersection divided by the size of the union of two
sets. If the Jaccard similarity of two signal vector is
larger than a threshold, they are identified as within
the contact proximity.
• Average L-1 distance (ALD): It is the average L-1 norm
of signal strength difference. If the ALD of two signal
vectors is less than a threshold, they are identified as
within the contact proximity.
• Euclidean distance (AED): It is the average Euclidean
distance of signal strength difference. If the AED of
two signal vectors is less than a threshold, they are
identified as within the contact proximity.
For the baseline approaches ALD and AED, given two
signal vectors A and B, if a signal is scanned in A but not in
B, the signal strength is set as -100 in B for calculation, and
vice versa. As the baseline approaches rely on a selected
threshold to detect contact, for a given contact proximity,
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Fig. 10. Comparison with baseline approaches on the office dataset.
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Fig. 11. Comparison with baseline approaches on the bus station dataset.
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Fig. 12. Comparison with baseline approaches on the shopping mall dataset.
we use the same strategy to select thresholds as discussed in
Section 4.2. Precision, recall, and F1-score are used as metrics
for performance comparison.
The results of precision, recall and F1-score versus prox-
imity on the three datasets are presented in Figures 10 (the
office), 11 (the bus station), and 12 (the shopping mall).
In Figure 10, the precision, recall, and F-1 score of differ-
ent approaches increase as the contact proximity increases.
vContact always outperforms other baseline approaches on
the metrics of precision and F-1 score. vContact has higher
recall than others when contact proximity is less than 5m
and has similar performance to Bluetooth when the contact
proximity is 5m. The curves of precision, recall and F1-score
on the other datasets have a similar trend to that on the
office dataset. As shown in Figure 11(a), the precision of
Bluetooth is slightly higher than vContact on the bus station
dataset. But vContact has better performance than Bluetooth
and other approaches with respect to recall and F1-score. As
for the performance on the shopping mall dataset, vContact
has similar precision to Bluetooth when contact proximity
is 1m and 2m, but has a significant improvement on pre-
cision when contact proximity is 3m and 4m. In Figure
12(b), vContact has similar recall to Bluetooth and ALD.
vContact always outperforms other approaches which use
WiFi data for detection. Overall, vContact has a higher F-1
score than other approaches in all datasets, indicating it is
more efficient for contact detection. We can also learn from
the figures that vContact and other approaches have better
performance in the indoor scenario, and the improvement
of vContact is more significant compared with the outdoor
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site.
5 APP IMPLEMENTATION AS A CASE STUDY
With the vContact SDK, we have implemented an Android
app which notifies its user exposure duration of the virus.
In this section, we first report its implementation details and
user interface in Section 5.1, followed by some measurement
results of the app to demonstrate and validate its design in
Section 5.2.
5.1 Implementation for exposure notification
We develop an app using our approach for exposure noti-
fication. Some screens of the app are shown in Figure 13.
As shown in Figure 13(a), once a user turns on the button
of “Exposure data collection”, the app will scan nearby WiFi
and store the data locally every 1 minute. The signal IDs (i.e.
the AP MAC addresses) are encrypted when the data are
stored. If one is confirmed infection, she/he could upload
her/his signal profile to the server (Figure 13(b)), so that
others could download the data for matching. If a user has
close contact with a confirmed case, she/he will receive a
notification, showing when the close contact happened and
how long the contact duration is (Figure 13(c)). In the app,
data are downloaded and matched automatically every day.
For the purpose of testing, we also have a testing mode as
shown in Figure 13(d), by which we can download the data,
and trigger the detection manually during the testing.
5.2 Testing and validation
We set the contact proximity as 2m for testing. The app
collects WiFi data every 1 minute. Hence, the detection
approach introduced in Section 3 will report a detection
result (i.e. true or false) for the data at each minute. In our
testing, if a user stays with the virus within 2m for more
than 5 minutes in a 10-minutes sliding time window, she/he
will receive a possible exposure notification. Noting that the
contact duration and the length of the sliding time window
are parameters for the app, which can be changed according
to the advice of the health officer.
We test the app in an office using five phones of different
brands. The procedures are as follows. One of the phones is
selected as the confirmed case, other phones are put at a
location which is 2m away from the confirmed case. The
button “Exposure data collection” is turned on for 15 min-
utes. Then, the confirmed case uploads its signal profile, and
the other phones download the signal profile for matching.
After that, we put other phones at a location which is 4m
away from the confirmed case and repeat the testing. Each
phone is selected as the confirmed case in turn. The ideal
result is that a phone only receives a notification when it
is 2m away from the confirmed case but no notification for
4m. The testing results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. A
√
refers that a phone receives a notification while × means it
does not receive a notification.
Table 2 shows the results of exposure notification for 2m.
It illustrates the good performance of our app for exposure
notification. The performance of the Honor phone is not
as good as other phones, indicating the different ability of
phones to scan WiFi signals.
We show the results of exposure notification for 4m in
Table 3. Compared with the results in Table 2, more phones
are detected as having non-close contact, which is consistent
with our expectation. Performance is distinct for different
phones, but the overall performance is good.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we consider automatic digital contact trac-
ing given that the virus has a lifespan. Leveraging upon
pervasive WiFi signals, we propose a private WiFi-based
approach termed vContact to detect close contacts within
the virus lifespan. Our approach captures both the case of
people simultaneously co-located with an infected person
and the case of those coming into an area previously visited
by an infected person within the virus lifetime. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first piece of work consid-
ering the virus lifespan in private contact tracing using
WiFi. We propose data processing approaches and a signal
similarity metric for close contact detection. We conduct
extensive experiments for evaluation. The experimental re-
sults demonstrate that our approach is efficient, stable,
and deployable. Our approach achieves high precision and
recall (50% – 90% when the contact proximity is 2m) for
different experimental sites, and it is robust to the impact of
different signal numbers and devices with different brands.
We have implemented an Android app based on vContact,
and demonstrated the validity of our design.
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